




MARGARET P. BATTIN 
EDITOR'S NOTE: 
One of the most provocative aspects of discipline-based art 
education is its claim to involve aesthetics as a source of content 
for curriculum even in the elementary grades. To some art 
educators the prospect of teaching philosophical and abstract 
aesthetics to school children seems unfeasible if not also unwise. 
In fact. as Margaret Battin pOints out in her paper, given at a 1985 
conference on the rationale for discipline-based art education, 
aesthetics' heady metaphysical, ontological, and epistemological 
questions about the nature of art and how it is valued are not 
usually of much concern to the average art viewer or even to many 
practising artists. Yet she maintains that even young children can 
practice forms of aesthetic inquiry, by creating puzzles and games 
which challenge them to think about what they see and perhaps 
try and suggest why visual forms are as they are. Battin uses a 
case study approach to describe a simple interaction in which 
children are asked to formulate answers to what is in fact an 
aesthetic conundrum. When the student explores the issues 
raised by the question he or she "is doing precisely what full-
grown, adult aestheticians with Ph.D.s and university appoint-
ments do." Battin also shows how the problem might be elabo-
rated for older or more sophisticated students. In putting forth an 
entirely realistic and feasible prospect for aesthetics to be in-
cluded as a source of content in DBAE Battin has faced head-on 
one of the thorniest challenges which has been faced by advo-
cates of the new paradigm. Margaret Battin is Associate Professor 
of Philosophy at the University of Utah. 
SOURCE: "What Can Aesthetics Contribute to a Young Person's Ability 
to Understand and Value Art?" Paper delivered at the Getty 
Seminar on the Discipline-Based Art Education Monograph, 
Scottsdale, Arizona, November 1985. 
T he most tempting answerto the question posed as the topic for these remarks -- "what can aesthetics con-tribute to a young person's ability to understand and value art?" -- is "nothing", or, at least. "embarrassingly little". Aesthetics, after all, is a field of philosophy, and 
hence a field dedicated to the analysis of abstract, foundational 
questions rarely raised in everyday life. The concerns of aesthet-
ics include metaphysical questions about the ontology of art, epis-
temological questions about valuational judgments in art, and ethi-
cal questions about the intersection of aesthetic and other values. 
But, aswe all know, you can live your life, and you can furthermore 
enjoy and contribute to the arts, without any formal examination of 
questions like these. It is hardly necessary to initiate oneself in the 
arcane disputes of aesthetics to view an exhibit, enjoy a recital, 
paint a canvas, or compose poetry. Indeed, most artlovers and 
practising artists have comparably little acquaintance with the 
formal discipline of aesthetics, and most show little interest in 
acquiring it. But if these things are true for adults, they may seem 
to be even more true for children, whose skills in the appreciation 
and production of the arts are only beginning to develop. 
Furthermore, not only do children seem to have little immediate 
appreciation for the kinds of abstract discussions aestheticians 127 
indulge in, if they can understand these discussions at all, but they 
display remarkably little tolerance for adult pedantry. To attempt to 
wedge aesthetics into the already congested curriculum of the 
ordinary elementary or high school might see m to provide kids with 
one more reason for disenchantment with the educational world. 
Indeed, to impose the study of aesthetics upon children whose 
opportunities for seeing and making art are already limited might 
seem gratuitously cruel. 
But there is a way to introduce aesthetic inquiry to children in a 
form that avoids these difficulties. While children dislike pedantry, 
they do like puzzles and problems, especially ones that make 
them think, and they are perfectly willing to think about puzzles 
about art. Here's one: 
AI Meinbart paints a portrait of art dealer Daffodil Glurt. The 
resulting canvas is a single solid color, chartreuse. Meinbart 
hangs the canvas in the Museum of Modern Art, labelled, 
"Portrait of Daffodil Glurt". Daffodil is not amused. But has she 
actually been insulted? 
Now the sly thing about a puzzle-case like this, of course, is that 
the puzzles in it are all aesthetic ones. Has Daffodil Glurt actually 
been insulted by Meinbart's all-chartreuse portrait? If so, how? 
The answer depends in part on whether nonobjective art can 
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make assertions (e.g., "Daffodil Glurt is a prissy, sour woman") or 
not, and if so, how we can know what these assertions are. It may 
seem that a solid color patch cannot portray or say anything. On 
the other hand, if it can say something, for instance that Daffodil 
is prissy and sour, why couldn't it equally well say that she is a 
woman with the bursting energies of early spring, like yellow-green 
forsythia buds just as they break into bloom. Or that she has the 
intoxicating pungent sweetness of a certain liqueur. And so on. 
Children are wizards at inventing things a solid patch of chartreuse 
might say, but in doing so they also see that it is difficult to say 
which one is right, or for that matter whether a solid patch of 
chartreuse says anything at all. At best, they may say, viewers may 
have varying emotional reactions to the alleged portrait, depend-
ing on whether they like the color chartreuse and how their moods 
are running that day, but these have nothing to do with any alleged 
claim about Daffodil Glurt that the artist might have made. 
When a child explores these issues, he is doing precisely what 
full-grown, adult aestheticians with Ph.D.s. and university ap-
pOintments do, although of course full-grown aestheticians forthe 
most part do it with an elaborate conceptual apparatus of abstract 
terminology. But the issues are the same: is art assertoric in 
character? What truthvalue can be assigned nonverbal utter-
ances? Are nonverbal presentations like paintings utterances at 
all? What characteristics must a work have to count as a portrait? 
To what degree are the aesthetic characteristics of a work a 
function of the perceptual and conceptual characteristics of the 
viewer? (This is the old "is beauty in the eye of the beholder?" 
issue.) Are there objective meaning-correlates for at least certain 
kinds of visual perceptions? What about the semiotic functions of 
art? What limits are there to the expressions of artists, or does the 
value of art override other considerations of social rights and 
utilities? And so on. Both children, at least with the help of a 
stimulating teacher, and full-grown aestheticians can extend the 
range of questions provoked by this simple puzzle-case nearly 
indefinitely, though children of course do it with a less ornate 
vocabulary and a lucky innocence of the academic literature. 
Even quite young children are sensitive to aesthetic issues, 
though the puzzle-cases which elicit them must be revised to 
interest younger minds. A second-grader, for instance, may have 
little antecedent interest in professional artists or art dealers, and 
never have heard of the Museum of Modern Art, but will respond 
to a case put like this: 
One day your teacher says she's going to draw a picture of you. 
She takes a sheet of paper and covers the whole thing with 
chartreuse crayon, you know, that yukky yellow-green color, 
and then she tacks it up on the board saying, "This is a picture 
of Billy G." Would you be mad? 
On the other hand, very much older children, including college 
students and professors, often find such issues compelling when 
cast in the language of rights and obligations, or as issues at law: 
AI Meinbart paints the solid-chartreuse portrait of Daffodil Glurt 
and hangs it in the Museum of Modern Art. Have Daffodil's rights 
been violated? Ought she be able to sue for defamation of 
character? For violation of contract in sitting for a portrait? 
Both children and adults also respond to actual cases, such as 
the real one on which the Daffodil case is based: 
In 1957, the abstract expressionist painter Ad Reinhardt painted 
a portrait of Paris art dealer Iris Clert. The portrait is black on 
black, and it is titled "Portrait of Iris Clert." Clert was flattered. 
Should she have been? 
But in all these versions of the problem, the underlying ques-
tions are the same: what can a picture say, and what features must 129 
it have in order to say something? How can we tell what a picture 
says? Does a portrait have to look like -- even slightly like -- the 
person it's a portrait of? What limits are there, if any, to what art 
may say? And so on. These questions, like the general questions 
of aesthetics -- what is art? How can we tell good art from bad art? 
What is the function or purpose of art? What is the value of art for 
SOCiety? and so on -- are all questions which can be posed in a way 
that is engaging for children as well as adults. Of course, aesthet-
ics as a discipline is often a good deal more successful in posing 
questions than in reaching answers, and the child's simple world 
may be disturbed by leading him to ask questions he cannot 
answer, but this discomfort is part of what we consider genuine 
education. After all, it is just this sort of questioning which may, 
ultimately, have profound effect on the way in which an adult 
person views, creates, and values art. 
